Orion Edgar, Things Seen and Unseen: The Logic of Incarnation in Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphysics of Flesh by Grumett, David
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orion Edgar, Things Seen and Unseen: The Logic of Incarnation
in Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphysics of Flesh
Citation for published version:
Grumett, D 2017, 'Orion Edgar, Things Seen and Unseen: The Logic of Incarnation in Merleau-Ponty’s
Metaphysics of Flesh' Reviews in Religion and Theology, vol. 24, pp. 273-5. DOI: 10.1111/rirt.12903
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/rirt.12903
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Reviews in Religion and Theology
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Grumett, D. (2017). Orion Edgar, Things Seen and
Unseen: The Logic of Incarnation in Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphysics of Flesh. Reviews in Religion and Theology,
24, 273-5., which has been published in final form at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rirt.12903/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
Things Seen and Unseen: The Logic of Incarnation in Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphysics of Flesh, Orion 
Edgar, James Clarke & Co, 2016 (ISBN 978-0-227-17594-1), 273 pp., Pb £22.75. 
 
Modern French philosophy has continued in the shadow of Descartes, with key figures like Levinas 
and Derrida seeking to rescue the thinking subject from his isolation by relating him to other 
subjects via the face, language, hospitality and similar forms of encounter. These encounters are, of 
course, embodied: my face is part of my body, language requires the physical movement of jaw and 
vocal chords, and in acts of welcome physical boundaries are inevitably transgressed. In so many 
expositions, however, the body seems to remain implicit. Against this backdrop, the oeuvre of the 
French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–61) deserves to be better known in the 
English-speaking world. The real strength of his philosophy, and of this engagement with it, is the 
metaphysical centrality granted to the body. 
 In his major systematic study Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty 
establishes the commonality of human life not by trying to make abstract connections between 
isolated minds but by showing that embodiment is fundamentally shared, preceding 
communication. This trajectory out of Cartesianism from the side not of mind but of matter is 
theologically suggestive. Orion Edgar follows it by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s posthumous and 
unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, which goes beyond the straightforward realism that 
some readers may take from his Phenomenology. He traces an ‘incarnational understanding which is 
never brought to completion but which is continually reworked and refined’ (p. 1).  
In chapter 1, the contours of Merleau-Ponty’s embodied philosophy are outlined. Humans 
are body-subjects in whom the subject-object opposition is dissolved. The example of one of my 
hands touching my other hand shows that I am simultaneously the subject and the object of my 
perceptions. Analogous illustrations could be drawn from the other senses, such as closing one eye 
and seeing my nose, hearing my footsteps or tasting my perspiration. Edgar deploys Merleau-Ponty 
to rehabilitate vision as the primary sense. Because it operates across large distances and is 
relatively comprehensive, vision unifies the world more than any other sense. Even so, this 
unification is achieved from a given position and requires perceptual faith: as Husserl so clearly 
understood, no object may be perceived comprehensively. For this reason if no other, sense is a 
unity—like vision itself, which is given by two separate organs. It is also intentional, as implied by the 
French sens, which entails direction rather than the passive reception of sense data. Faithful 
perception suggests a Heideggerian recognition of transcendence as the depth and re-enchantment 
of the world. 
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Suspending close engagement with Merleau-Ponty, chapter 2 offers a constructive excursus 
on eating. With Spinoza, Edgar contends that the fundamental mode of human desiring is appetite. 
Relating desire to eating is instructive because it demonstrates how desire ‘rests upon culture, 
geography, agriculture, and my personal tastes, as well as a certain kind of whim’ (p. 49). Moreover, 
although eating is in one aspect the satisfaction of hunger, by engaging the intimate senses of taste 
and touch it shows how these are rooted in society and politics. Chapter 3 locates Merleau-Ponty in 
the context of debates about perspective, light and lenses. As the linear perspective of Descartes’s 
Optics became dominant, the notion that perception is an event, an encounter, between person and 
object became lost. Yet taking seriously our existence as perceiving beings, Edgar hints, has 
tremendous implications for how we humans see our place in the world. By reconnecting with our 
animality, we reconsider the status of other animals. By overturning the Cartesian distinction 
between mental substance and extended substance, we are provoked to reflect again, as did Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, on the nature and emergence of consciousness. 
 In chapter 4, titled ‘Restoring sight to the blind’, Edgar develops the implications of this 
philosophy for how we see. Although any true act of perception refutes a simplistic subject-object 
dualism, such an act is not itself synthetic, being grounded in what Merleau-Ponty terms ‘work 
already completed . . . a general synthesis constituted once and for all’ (p. 111). This imbricated 
science, sedimented in the world but also in me, teaches me habits of perception for which the 
Platonic theory of extramission—according to which my eyes emit rays of light that strike external 
objects of perception—serves as a useful metaphor. My perception of even a mundane item, such as 
a plate, integrates a complex set of perspectival shapes.  
  The final two chapters, 5 and 6, bring what Edgar terms Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh 
into dialogue with the theology of the incarnation. Christ takes life in the depth of things as their 
logos, rising, as do humans, out of a depth of embodiment. This suggests that truths about Christ 
need to be adduced from the world rather than being derived from revelation of an abstract kind. 
Importantly though, this fleshly metaphysics does not issue in a radical phenomenology of flesh, as 
with Michel Henry. Rather, it draws us back beneath immanence into a properly Catholic 
sacramental ontology, in which flesh is the meeting point of, as the Nicene Creed puts it, ‘all things 
visible and invisible’. It might be added that this Johannine view of the flesh associates Merleau-
Ponty with a strong Patristic tradition of the Eucharist as bringing fleshly, not merely bodily, 
participation in Christ. 
 Merleau-Ponty broke from the Roman Catholic Church in his twenties and his early exposure 
to scholastic theology accounts for his rejection of theology as a whole. Here, Edgar cumulatively 
fleshes out a more constructive engagement fluently, cogently, and in all senses, deeply 
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perceptively. Some questions remain unanswered, such as the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s early 
and now lost work on Plotinus’s intelligible multiple on his later thought, and the impact of editorial 
decisions on his posthumous reception. Nevertheless, we should be extremely grateful to Edgar for 
opening a significant new field of research, which it can only be hoped others will enter. 
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